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RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS
John Hursht
1. TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFTI BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS? ARE WE SAFER?
The most significant legacy left by the 9/11 attacks is the
fundamentally altered way that the U.S. government engages both
with its citizens at home and with the international community
abroad. Indeed, the United States' response to the 9/11 attacks
forever changed the relationship between the American state and
its citizens. Immediately following 9/11, American citizens came
together in great solidarity and the nation enjoyed overwhelming
support and sympathy from the international community. Less
than eighteen months later, the Bush Administration's decision to
invade Iraq divided the nation and robbed the United States of this
support and sympathy.
The solidarity displayed by American citizens and the initial
outpouring of nationalist sentiment was not surprising given the
nature of the 9/11 attacks. In fact, the galvanization of public
opinion following 9/11 finds historical precedent in the American
public's reaction to the attacks on Pearl Harbor nearly sixty years
earlier.' What is surprising is that ten years after the 9/11 attacks,
the United States remains engaged in two large-scale, but vaguely
defined missions abroad that blend armed conflict,
counterinsurgency, intelligence gathering, diplomacy, and nation
building. Equally surprising is the number of unresolved U.S.
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Institute. Snyder Fellow, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of
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1. Joe Kleinsasser, Pearl Harbor, 9/11 Attacks Have Similarities, Differences,
WICHITAST. U. (Sept. 6, 2011, 10:54 AM), http://www.wichita.edu/thisis/wsunews
/news/?nid=1564 (quoting John Dreifort, a history professor at Wichita State
University) ("[P]ublic opinion was galvanized in the aftermath of both attacks,
and this was aided by presidential speeches that drew public support for action
against the aggressors.").
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domestic policies that are necessary to prevent future attacks. Vital
legal and policy questions as wide-ranging as immigration reform,
the prosecution of alleged terrorists, and the protection of
fundamental constitutional safeguards lack definitive answers.
Moreover, while addressing any of these questions requires a
complex assessment of numerous costs and benefits, nearly all
attempts to address these issues have been seriously hampered by
political divisiveness and a lack of political leadership.
Nonetheless, that so many key questions directly affecting national
security remain unresolved is troubling.
Domestically, the U.S. government-first under the Bush
Administration and now under the Obama Administration-
continues to engage in national security policies that undermine
core civil liberties. The indefinite detention of alleged terrorists
and the killing of U.S. citizens without meaningful due process'
illustrate just how far national security-policy has shifted. Enacting
such policies before 9/11 is nearly unimaginable. Less dramatic
policies, such as the way Americans move through airports or risk
imprisonment by donating to the wrong charitable organization,
further underscore the dysfunctional relationship between the
American state and its citizens.
Indeed, the domestic legacy of 9/11 is perhaps best
epitomized by a culture of fear and distrust that pervades American
society a decade after the attacks. The sweeping executive power
enshrined in the Patriot Act, a continued lack of accountability for
the U.S. officials that authorized, legitimized, or engaged in
torture, and the erosion of due process and the rule of law
demonstrate the U.S. government's post-9/11 state of mind.
Adding to this fear and distrust is the refusal of the U.S.
government to provide meaningful information regarding its
actions at home and abroad. For example, when criticizing the
drone strike in Yemen that killed U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, Yale
University law professor Bruce Ackerman notes, "Obama's fellow
citizens can't begin to judge his actions on the basis of the shallow
news releases and public commentaries provided by his
2. Bruce Ackerman, Obama's Death Panel, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/07/obamas death-panel?page=
0,0.
3. See Daniel Larison, The Real Legacy of 9/11, THE WEEK (Sept. 12, 2011, 2:47
PM), http://theweek.com/builpen/column/219171/the-real-legacy-of-91 1.
1550 [Vol. 38:5
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spokespeople-and rumors only make the situation worse.,4
Ackerman's criticism is telling, as it speaks to a larger and
more profound alienation between state and citizen. From the
Bush Administration's failed Operation TIPS to the Obama
Administration's reaffirmation of an extremely expansive use of the
state secrets privilege, American citizens are encouraged to
monitor their fellow citizens, but are unable to hold government
officials accountable. These legal strategies foster distrust between
citizens and the government at the expense of meaningful dialogue
and political participation. President Obama's decision to adopt
the Bush Administration's expansive use of the state secrets
privilege is especially damaging to efforts that would rebuild trust
between the U.S. government and its citizens. As the Center for
Constitutional Rights states:
The abuse of the state secrets privilege undermines the
very idea of an independentjudiciary; contradicts the core
idea of judicial review, in which independent judges make
independent evaluations of all of the facts; and essentially
allows the executive branch to dictate to the federal courts
what cases they can and can't hear.
Internationally, the reputation of the United States has yet to
fully recover from the 2003 Iraq invasion." The Bush
Administration's disregard of fundamental principles of
international law and global governance combined with its
belligerent and arrogant tone strained political allegiances and
greatly diminished the Unites States' standing within the
international community. The Administration's unilateral "go-it-
alone" foreign policy allowed the United States to react to national
security threats more quickly, but it also demonstrated that in the
twenty-first century's increasingly interdependent global society, no
nation-regardless of its military, economic, or political might-
can accomplish its national security goals without international
cooperation. A unilateral foreign policy also inevitably lacks
oversight and may result in outcomes that would most likely not
4. Ackerman, supra note 2.
5. 100 Days: End the Abuse of the State Secrets Pivilege, CTR. FOR CONSr. RTs.,
http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/100-days%3A-end-abuse-state-secrets-
privilege (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
6. Gregor Peter Schmitz, Bush's Tragic Legacy: How 9/11 Triggered America's
Decline, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international
/world/0,1518,785405,00.html ("Even in foreign policy, the world power is no
longer seen as the world's role model.").
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occur during multilateral operations. Human rights abuses, most
notably torture committed by American personnel at Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo Bay, and Bagram Air Force Base, offer a stark
reminder of the need for international cooperation and
multilateral oversight.
Despite this culture of fear and distrust, Americans are safer
now than they were before the 9/11 attacks. Although there are
several reasons for this increased safety, the most significant reason
is largely outside of the control of U.S. policymakers. While
improved intelligence and better security measures have no doubt
contributed to a safer United States, the overwhelming rejection of
political violence by Muslims living in Islamic states has made the
decisive difference in creating a more secure America. Of course,
recent events such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempt to
detonate an explosive device on a plane bound for Detroit,
demonstrate that al Qaeda and similar organizations are still
actively trying to kill Americans. Accordingly, it would be a mistake
to reduce funding for the intelligence community or to relax
current security safeguards. It would be a much larger mistake,
however, to ignore the lesson that the Islamic world's
overwhelming rejection of violent ideologies has provided. Once
again, history reminds us that occupation-no matter how well
intentioned-simply will not create the results that the occupier
intends. Rather, by encouraging internal reform and by offering
technical assistance and partnership, U.S. policymakers create
allies, build strategic relationships, and cultivate an environment
much more conducive toward accomplishing national security
objectives.
7. John R. MacArthur, The Sad Legacy of Sept. 11, HARPER'S MAG. (Sept. 10,
2011), http://harpers.org/archive/2011/09/hbc-90008237.
8. Editorial, The Legacy of 9/11, BALT. SUN (Sept. 11, 2011), http://articles
.baltimoresun.com/2011-09-1 1/news/bs-ed-sept-1 1-anniversary-2011091 1_1_qaida-
osama-bin-laden-national-security.
[T]he majority of those living in the Middle East today have not
embraced bin Laden's world outlook. If anything, the region has
become somewhat more democratic than before, with several of its
oppressive leaders swept away in the Arab Spring-not by terrorism but
through civil uprising, rallying not over U.S. actions but more
fundamental problems of poverty, food prices and lack of democratic
institutions.
Id.
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4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/5
FIVE QUESTIONS: HURSH
2. WHAT IMPACT WILL THE "ARAB SPRING" HAVE ON AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY?
The impact of the Arab Spring on American national security
will be significant. Perhaps most importantly, U.S. policymakers
will have to confront Islamist politics in a meaningful way. The
time of U.S.-backed autocrats supplying reliable oil in exchange for
hands-off American foreign policy is nearing an end. Supporting
repressive Arab leaders who argue that their countries are not
ready for democracy-the so-called Algerian Scenario9-remains a
shortsighted strategy, and as the Arab Spring has demonstrated,
such tactics only alienate the country's population from the United
States. Moreover, this strategy is unsustainable. If the Arab Spring
has provided only a single lesson, it is that repression will eventually
lead to revolt.
Moderate Islamist political organizations, often unofficially,
have long garnered the most political support in several Islamic
states. In contrast, secularism writ large has failed to gain the
traction that many U.S. policymakers and commentators have long
hoped that it would. The Arab Spring will show whether U.S.
officials can respect democratic outcomes that result in elected
leaders and political decisions that the United States would rather
avoid. Historically, the United States has shown an unwillingness to
accept democratically elected Islamist leaders. Take, for example,
the response of the United States to the Hamas electoral victory in
2006. U.S. officials did not recognize the legitimacy of this result or
attempt to move Hamas from an organization that engaged in
political violence to a legitimate political actor, such as the
reintegration of the Irish Republic Army in Northern Ireland.
Instead, the United States planned to overthrow Hamas-a
democratically elected government.'o Obviously, such a tactic is a
clear violation of state sovereignty and international law. It is also
deeply hypocritical.
Given such foreign policy approaches, it is unsurprising that
U.S. policymakers are still struggling to reengage with Arab leaders
to regain trust and influence within the region. President Obama's
9. See Francesco Cavatorta, Alternative Lessons from the 'Algerian Scenario', 2
PERSP. ON TERRORIsM 7 (2008).
10. Suzanne Goldenberg, US Plotted to Overthrow Hamas After Election Victory,
GuARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/04/usa
.israelandthepalestinians.
15532012]
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Cairo Speech" was a positive step toward regaining this trust, but
recent polls show that the approval ratings of the United States
within the region have plummeted since this speech.
As usual, the largest obstacles to regaining trust and influence
in the Arab world are U.S. foreign policy toward Israel and the U.S.
role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Inevitable changes resulting
from the Arab Spring will only make navigating these issues more
difficult. Foreign policy experts have already noted the cooled
relationship between Egypt and Israel." Likewise, the Palestinian
push for recognized statehood in the United Nations General
Assembly and the United States' unnecessarily preemptive and
rigid response to this proposition will only exacerbate the difficulty
of navigating these issues.
Strained foreign relations with Arab states will make achieving
national security objectives increasingly difficult. Implementing
and executing national security programs requires trust and
cooperation between states. The Unites States risks losing or at
least significantly compromising its ability to rely on the
cooperation of allies throughout this key region unless it adopts
more balanced policies regarding the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
Likewise, American attempts to influence the political process
through extra-legal means risk not only diplomatic embarrassment
but also national security failure by denying U.S. officials key
information and access within the region.
Fortunately, the Arab Spring presents opportunities as well as
challenges for American national security. Most importantly, the
Arab Spring provides the United States with an opportunity to reset
its role in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to recalibrate its
relationship with both Israel and Palestine. A genuine
recommitment to supporting the creation of a Palestinian state will
result in a more secure Middle East and North Africa-as well as a
more secure Israel and United States. In addition, by supporting
democratically elected leaders, the United States will demonstrate a
commitment to respecting state sovereignty and not overplaying its
11. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning
(June 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09).
12. ARAB AMt. INST. FOUND., ARAB AyrITUDEs, 2011, 1 (2011), available at
http://aai.3cdn.net/5d2b8344e3b3b7efl9_xkm6ba4r9.pdf.
13. Abdel Monem Said Aly & Shai Feldman, Testing the Resilience of Egyptian-
Israeli Peace, 56 MIDDLE EAsT BRIEF 1, 2 (2011), available at
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB56.pdf.
1554 [Vol. 38:5
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hand within the region-a lesson that U.S. policymakers
continually fail to appreciate. Unfortunately, while the Arab Spring
provides opportunities to strengthen diplomatic ties that will aid
national security, the United States has not yet embraced these
opportunities.
3. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE AHMED WARSAME CASE?
The most important lesson to learn from the Obama
Administration's handling of the Ahmed Warsame case is not to
make easy decisions into hard decisions. The Obama
Administration deserves praise for making the correct legal and
policy decision to try Ahmed Warsame in a civilian court. However,
the Administration also deserves criticism for initially detaining
Warsame indefinitely and without charge. Ultimately, the Obama
Administration made the correct decision, but Warsame's two-
month "temporary, indefinite" detention aboard a U.S. naval vessel
mars this decision.1 4 Warsame's detention adds unnecessary legal
challenges to his trial and undermines President Obama's
commitment to ending extra-legal detention.
There are three key legal issues regarding the Warsame case.
The first issue is whether the Obama Administration had the legal
authority to detain Warsame. Obama Administration officials claim
that international humanitarian law justified Warsame's
detention,1 5 but this claim is tenuous at best. Although the Obama
Administration has not yet explicitly stated what legal authority
allowed for Warsame's detention, any explanation will likely involve
a strained interpretation of the law. U.S. officials captured
Warsame in international waters and he was not on any recognized
battlefield. U.S. officials might argue that they can detain Warsame
because he is somehow covered by the Congressional authorization
16
that allowed for military force against the perpetrators of 9/11,
but such a claim is not credible. Likewise, a claim that Warsame's
14. Editorial, Terrorism and the Law, N.Y. TIMEs (July 16, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/opinion/sunday/17sunl.html ("President
Obama has created yet another parallel system of unlimited detention and
interrogation without rights outside the constitutional norms that served us well
for more than two centuries before the Bush Administration carelessly and
needlessly tossed them aside for terrorism cases after Sept. 11, 2001.").
15. Id.
16. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, S. J. Res. 23,
107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
2012] 1555
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alleged connection to al Shabaab or al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula somehow justifies his detention also lacks credibility, as
the United States is not engaged in armed conflict with either
organization and the Administration's claim that it may target or
detain members of these organizations is dubious.
The fact that the Obama Administration held Warsame on a
naval vessel, rather than in Guantinamo Bay or in a U.S. prison,
illustrates the legal failure of the current national security policy
regarding detainment. Warsame's detainment is an ad hoc
solution with questionable legal authority. While correctly refusing
to recognize Guantinamo Bay as a legal option, the Obama
Administration merely created a very similar legal loophole that
likely will not withstand future scrutiny. In addition, it is deeply
troubling to learn that U.S. officials have used this tactic previously
to hold detainees until the Department of Justice can build a case
against the detained."
The Obama Administration is correct to close Guantinamo
Bay and its decision to refuse to send new prisoners to that facility
is laudable.m Guantanamo Bay remains a rallying point for
extremists intending to harm the United States and a continued
diplomatic obstacle. Moreover, military prosecutions at
Guantinamo Bay have proven tremendously inefficient, while
failing to demonstrate that they result in greater national security.
Still, U.S. officials should have followed the law and simply arrested
Warsame and charged him with a crime. U.S. officials clearly had
enough information to arrest and charge Warsame. Further,
Warsame's location in international waters provided U.S. officials
the additional advantage of not needing to file an extradition
request. It is unacceptable to detain individuals for an indefinite
time in violation of U.S. and international law. Breaking the law to
uphold the law is a defeatist strategy and an ineffective national
security policy.
17. Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Prosecute a Somali Suspect in Civilian
Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/world
/africa/06detain.html (noting Vice Admiral William H. McRaven, then
commander of U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, stated that detainees are
sometimes kept on Navy ships or detained in a third country until the Department
ofJustice can build a case against the detainee).
18. Colin Moynihan, Somali Terrorism Suspect Appears in Civilian Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011). http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/nyregion/terrorism-
suspect-appears-in-civilian-court-in-ny.html (statement of Deputy National Security
AdvisorJohn 0. Brennan).
1556 [Vol. 38:5
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The second issue is interrogation. U.S. officials detained
Warsame for more than two months, then, during a break from
interrogation, invited an International Committee for the Red
Cross representative to visit him before bringing in a new set of
interrogators to begin a criminal investigation. Importantly,
Warsame received a proper Miranda warning before the criminal
investigation portion of his detainment began. While the Obama
Administration deserves praise for making it clear that Warsame
was now a criminal suspect with Miranda rights, the Administration
also deserves criticism for making a simple criminal procedure
unnecessarily difficult.
Warsame's interrogation will almost certainly present
substantial challenges for federal prosecutors. It will be difficult to
sort two months of inadmissible statements from later admissible
statements. Warsame's lawyers have already indicated that they
plan to challenge the admissibility of his statements due to the
irregularities surrounding his detention and his Miranda warning.
Again, these difficulties were easily avoidable, which makes the
Administration's actions even more frustrating. In an interrogation
during an armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions apply and
interrogators may use techniques listed in the Army Field Manual
and other compliant techniques. During a criminal investigation,
Miranda warnings apply and criminal investigators must adhere to
procedures that do not violate these rights. Sometimes it really is
just that simple.
The Obama Administration's "public safety" delay in warning a
suspect of his or her Miranda rights is very disappointing. As a New
York Times editorial stated in July 2011:
Mr. Obama came to office vowing to stop these costly
travesties of justice that so damaged America's
international reputation. But he has steadily retreated,
sometimes in the face of political opposition, sometimes
on his own. Now he is drifting toward establishing his
own system of extralegal detention and tainted
questioning. 19
The third issue is trial; or more specifically, balancing the
national security need to collect intelligence with the need to
adhere to the rule of law when deciding what type of trial the
suspect will receive. Of course, U.S. officials should also select the
19. Terrorism and the Law, supra note 14.
15572012]
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trial strategy with the greatest probability of securing a conviction.
Given these criteria, it is difficult to understand why elected
officials and commentators would argue that Warsame should
receive a trial before a military commission, as all evidence suggests
that convicting Warsame will be much easier and more probable in
a civilian court.
The Center for Law and Security notes that between
September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2009, U.S. officials have
20
conducted 828 prosecutions of alleged terrorists in federal courts.
Of those 828 prosecutions, 593 cases have been resolved, resulting
in 523 convictions and only 28 acquittals or dismissals. This is a
conviction rate of 88.2 percent. In rather striking contrast, trials
before military commissions have resulted in six convictions, 2 all
against minor figures. Trying Warsame in a military commission
would require proving that he was an actual member of al Qaeda or
that he was personally involved in plotting attacks on the United
States. Proving either of these charges would be quite difficult. In
comparison, in civilian court, federal prosecutors will only have to
prove that Warsame provided material support to a terrorist
organization to secure a conviction, a much easier proposition.
4. OF ALL THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH TYPE IS THE
UNITED STATES LEAST PREPARED TO HANDLE? WHERE IS THE UNITED
STATES MOST VULNERABLE TO ATTACK?
The United States is least prepared to handle a cyber security
attack. While cyber security is the threat U.S. officials are least
prepared to prevent or mitigate, the United States is most
vulnerable not to a foreign attack, but to an internal collapse due
to its weakened economic position, an overburdened military
stretched too thin for too long, and wavering political support for
continued military missions abroad among its citizens and foreign
allies. Historians will find these vulnerabilities and this scenario
quite familiar and commentators have already noted that such
20. CTR. ON LAw & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-
SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 1 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org
/Portals/0/documents/02_TTRCFinalJanl42.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Terrorism and the Law, supra note 14 ("Two important goals must guide
terrorist-related cases-eliciting information to thwart future plots and punishing
the guilty. The overwhelming evidence from the past decade is that both are most
reliably served by lawful interrogation and prosecution in civilian courts.").
1558 [Vol. 38:5
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vulnerabilities have led to the decline of previous societies. 23
Before continuing, it is important to distinguish preparedness
from vulnerability. Preparedness is being prepared for a specific
type of event, whereas vulnerability refers to being susceptible to a
specific type of event. Thus, it is possible to be prepared but
vulnerable. Likewise, it is also possible to be invulnerable, but
unprepared. Finally, it is also possible to be both unprepared and
vulnerable, which describes a worst-case scenario for national
security officials. Here, the most important point is that while the
United States may be unprepared to handle a particular type of
attack or a particular set of circumstances, a different type of attack
or a different set of circumstances may cause more harm even if the
United States is more prepared for that type of attack or those
circumstances. Thus, while the United States is least prepared for a
cyber security attack, there are other types of attacks or
contingencies, for which the United States is more prepared, that
would cause greater harm should they occur due to particular U.S.
vulnerabilities. This is the case now, as a serious cyber security
attack, while capable of causing substantial harm, would not create
the same amount of harm as an internal collapse.
Regarding cyber security, President Obama has stated that the
growing number of cyber security attacks has become "one of the
most serious economic and national security threats our nation
faces."24  Perhaps the best explanation for cyber security
unpreparedness is the very nature of these attacks, which remain
largely hidden to policymakers and the American public. Watching
a broadcast of a bombing that kills and injures civilians clearly
demonstrates risk and danger. Creating public support to pressure
policymakers and public officials to prevent those types of attacks is
relatively straightforward given the visual image that such attacks
create. The same is not true of cyber attacks, the danger of which
is not easily conveyed to the public. The hidden nature of cyber
attacks both lessens the perceived risk that these attacks pose and
provides cover for the actors launching these attacks. In addition,
global reliance on the internet and computer networks results in a
23. Philip Slater, The Folly of Bush's Go-It-Alone Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2,
2008, 1:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-slater/the-folly-of-bushs-
goital b_79271.html ("Most empires in the past went into decline because they
exhausted themselves making war, and we seem to be headed down the same
path.").
24. Cybersecurity, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURlY, http://www.dhs
.gov/files/cybersecurity.shtm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
2012] 1559
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system that is always liable to attack. As the Center for Strategic
and International Studies' James Andrew Lewis notes, the
internet's connectivity provides "endless opportunities for
mischief.",2  Similarly, the relative newness of the technology
creates unpredictability, making planning national security defense
that much more difficult.
Despite these challenges, it is imperative to develop a robust
cyber security defense plan given the unavoidable reality of using
the internet and computing technology. In the report, Securing
Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, the Commission states:
[W] e are in a long-term struggle with criminals, foreign
intelligence agencies, militaries, and others with whom we
are intimately and unavoidably connected through a
global digital network; and this struggle does more real
damage every day to the economic health and national
security of the United States than any other threat.
Security experts and policymakers must continue to address this
national security threat. Likewise, political actors should follow
President Obama's lead, noting the risk that cyber security
unpreparedness creates and providing adequate funding to address
this risk.
Admittedly, the threat of an internal collapse at first seems an
unlikely possibility for the United States' most vulnerable point for
attack. Since 9/11, however, the United States has suffered
significant economic setbacks while regional powers have begun to
emerge as future economic superpowers. Although the rise of
China is a much-discussed topic regarding American national
security, the emergence of India and Brazil also merit serious
discussion. The rise of these economic powers, combined with the
decline of the United States' unchallenged economic superiority
has shifted global economics to a multipolar system. Although this
development will likely aid U.S. national security in the long-term,
25. Assessing the Threat of Cyberterrorism, NPR (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=123531188.
26. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, COMM'N ON CYBERSECURITY FOR THE
44TH PRESIDENCY, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 77 (Dec. 2008),
available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace
44.pdf.
27. Lionel Barber, The End of US Hegemony: Legacy of 9/11, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 5,
2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6acfla6,d54d-11eO-bd7e-00144feab49a
.html#axzzlemtp9oel (noting that Gerard Lyons, Standard Chartered Bank's
chief economist, stated that the three most important words in the past decade
were not "war on terror" but "made in China").
1560 [Vol. 38:5
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since greater wealth distribution typically results in less conflict,
this development will also create short-term challenges that U.S.
national security officials must address.
Complicating this already difficult situation is the staggering
national debt. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral
Michael Mullen received substantial media attention when he
stated that the national debt poses the single greatest threat to U.S.
national security. While other commentators had raised this
argument before, Mullen's role as the top U.S. military officer
legitimized this argument in a way that policy experts and think
tank articles simply cannot. Put bluntly, when the leader of the
world's most powerful military calls the national debt the single
largest obstacle to national security, people take notice.
It is indisputable that the United States occupies a significantly
weakened economic position now than it did on September 10,
2001. Contributing to the United States' economic decline is the
cost of waging two wars for much of the past decade. War is
expensive. A recent Congressional Research Service report placed
a $1.283 trillion dollar price tag on U.S. military operations within
Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11." While this figure may not seem
extraordinary given that the 2010 U.S. GDP exceeded $14 trillion,
this figure does not represent the substantial opportunity costs that
waging these wars entailed.
Finally, economic production and, in turn, national security
depend on access to natural resources. As Sharon Burke of the
Center for a New American Security notes, "[i]n the 21st century,
the security of nations will increasingly depend on the security of
natural resources, or 'natural security.'. Burke's point illustrates
another challenge to American national security, as China seems
28. See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICA VORLD (2008) (discussing
the sources of conflict in and between countries, including the distribution of
wealth and the inequalities between people).
29. Michel J. Carden, National Debt Poses Security Threat, Mullen Says, ARMED
FORCES PRESS SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.defense
.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60621.
30. AMxY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33110, THE COST OF IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 10
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.
31. Sharon Burke, Natural Security 9 (Ctr. for New Am. Sec., Working Paper,
June 2009). available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications
/CNASWorking%20Paper Natural%20SecuritySBurke june2009 OnlineNEW_
0.pdf.
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more poised to secure vital natural resources in Africa3 and already
holds a near monopoly on some resources, such as rare earth
metals that are essential for industrial production.
Compoundin these economic issues is a military clearly
stretched too thin with too many redeployments, a failing political
appetite for missions abroad, and a nation strongly divided along
partisan lines. Ten years after the 9/11 attacks, Americans are
nearly as divided as they were united in late 2001, and perhaps the
only widely agreed point between Americans is how poorly its
elected government is performing.
All of these factors point to a nation in real danger of an
internal collapse. Of course, an internal collapse in the United
States would not mirror an internal collapse in a developing
country. Bloody riots and civil unrest are unlikely, but a moderate
to gradual decline that dislodges the United States from its position
as the world's lone superpower is possible. This moment will
eventually come, as it does for all civilizations, but it is imperative
that U.S. leaders work to prepare for this moment. Leaders must
prepare the nation to .be one of a handful of superpowers, rather
than refuse to acknowledge this development and the reduced
influence that such a development will entail. From a national
security standpoint, this development will necessitate a refocusing
on multilateral actions and international relationships. Certainly,
some acts will not require the United States to seek global support
and cooperation, but the great majority will. Beginning to
construct a national security policy around this eventuality is
necessary for the long-term good of the nation, and U.S. leaders
must take the first step toward multilateralism at home by
32. See generally CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRIcA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR
HEGEMON? (2007) (discussing China's new foreign policy toward Africa, and
Africa's support of China instead of the United States).
33. See generally CINDY HURST, INST. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL SEC., CHINA'S
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS INDUSTRY: WHAT CAN THE WEST LEARN? (Mar. 2010),
available at http://www.iags.org/rareearth0310hurst.pdf.
34. Bryan Bender, Army Stretched Too Thin, Says General, Bos. GLOBE (Sept. 27,
2011), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/09/27
/armyjis worntoo_thin-says-general.
35. Frank Newport, Congress' Job Approval Entrenched at Record Low of 13%,
GALLUP (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150728/Congress-Job-
Approval-Entrenched-Record-Low.aspx ("At this point, approval of the way
Congress is handling its job remains low among all Americans, regardless of their
political party identification: Republicans, independents, and Democrats are all in
a range of 11% to 15% approval.").
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demonstrating that they can work together to strengthen the U.S.
economy, reduce the strain on the military, and begin to regain the
confidence of the American people.
5. WHAT FACTORS WILL HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AL QAEDA HAS
BEEN DEFEATED?
Determining whether al Qaeda has been defeated will require
assessing several factors, but the recent killing of Osama bin Laden
satisfies one essential requirement. From a psychological
standpoint, the defeat of al Qaeda required the capture or killing
of bin Laden. Similarly, killing or capturing bin Laden was
necessary for Americans to begin to move past 9/11 in a
constructive way.
Other factors necessary for determining al Qaeda's defeat are
the further capture or killing of al Qaeda's leadership and the
continued depletion of the organization's financial resources.
Without leadership or financial means, al Qaeda's ability to
coordinate and complete large-scale and high-profile attacks is
severely compromised. Recent developments suggest that the
United States is on the cusp of satisfying these two criteria. The
killing of Anwar al-Awlaki demonstrates that al Qaeda's leadership
remains vulnerable to U.S. strikes, while evidence recovered in the
raid that killed bin Laden suggest that al Qaeda desperately needs
36
money to continue its operations.
While these factors are necessary for determining al Qaeda's
defeat, perhaps the most significant factor for determining al
Qaeda's defeat is relevancy. When al Qaeda becomes an irrelevant
organization that lacks operational effectiveness, it will have been
defeated. A total defeat of al Qaeda is all but impossible. Still, a
largely irrelevant al Qaeda will be a defeated al Qaeda.
Importantly, American citizens and U.S. policymakers must
not conflate the defeat of al Qaeda, which may be imminent," with
the defeat of all extremist Islamic groups. Even as al Qaeda
retreats, losing relevancy and operational capacity, anti-American
and anti-Western sentiment continues, and other extremist groups
will emerge to take al Qaeda's role.
36. Elisabeth Bumiller, Panetta Says Defeat of Al Qaeda Is 'Within Reach, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2011), http://wvw.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/asia
/10military.html.
37. Id.
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